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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
GENERAL OBLIGATIONS LAW

GOL § 5-1311(1) (a)(1): Remedy of specific performance with
abatement available to purchaser notwithstanding material destruction of property
General Obligations Law section 5-1311 allocates to a vendor
the risk of loss in an executory contract for the sale of real property. 8 Although the statute appears to single out rescission of the
GOL § 5-1311 (1978) provides in pertinent part:
1. Any contract for the purchase and sale or exchange of realty shall be interpreted, unless the contract expressly provides otherwise, as including an agreement that the parties shall have the following rights and duties:
a When neither the legal title nor the possession of the subject matter of
the contract has been transferred to the purchaser: (1) if all or a material part
thereof is destroyed without fault of the purchaser or is taken by eminent domain,
the vendor cannot enforce the contract, and the purchaser is entitled to recover
any portion of the price that he has paid. . . (2) if an immaterial part thereof is
destroyed without fault of the purchaser or is taken by eminent domain, neither
the vendor nor the purchaser is thereby deprived of the right to enforce the contract; but there shall be, to the extent of the destruction or taking, an abatement
of the purchase price.
Id. Prior to 1963, the statute was designated as Real Property Law section 240-a, Uniform
Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act, ch. 731, § 1, [1936] N.Y. Laws 1597 (repealed 1963) (current version at GOL § 5-1311 (1978)). The statute was enacted to alter the long-standing
common-law rule of equitable conversion, which placed the risk of loss on the purchaser of
real estate prior to transfer of title or possession. Acts, Recommendation and Study relating
to Risk of Loss in Executory Contracts for the Sale of Real Property, [1936] N.Y. LAW REV.
COMM'N Ran. 755, 759-60 [hereinafter cited as 1936 Study]. See generally Sewell v. Underhill, 197 N.Y. 168, 90 N.E. 430 (1910); Persico v. Guernsey, 129 Misc. 190, 220 N.Y.S. 689
(Sup. Ct. Erie County), aff'd, 222 App. Div. 719, 225 N.Y.S. 890 (4th Dep't 1927); Pellegrino
v. Giuliani, 118 Misc. 329, 193 N.Y.S. 258 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1922).
The theory of equitable conversion was criticized by many commentators, largely on the
ground that since the purchaser only became the beneficial owner of the realty after transfer
of possession, not after contract, it would be unjust to earlier impose upon him the obligations or risks of ownership. See, e.g., S. Williston, Professor Williston's Notes on Risk of
Loss After a Contract to Sell Land, reprinted in HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FoURTH AN-

NUAL CONFERENCE 204-05 (1934); Holland, Risk of Loss and Insurance in Contracts for the
Sale of Real Estate, 5 Tax. L. REv. 249, 261-62 (1927); Vanneman, Risk of Loss, In Equity,
Between the Date of Contract to Sell Real Estate and Transfer of Title, 8 MINN. L. REV.
127, 141-43 (1923); Note, Legislation-Vendor and Purchaser-UniformRisk of Loss Act,
14 N.Y.U. L. REv. 240 (1937). In New York, the interplay of equitable conversion principles
and prevailing insurance law, moreover, had created the anomaly wherein the purchaser,
who generally did not insure the realty prior to taking title or possession, was denied recourse to the vendor's insurance in the event of damage to the property. See 1936 Study,
supra, at 763. Recognizing the inequities of the common-law rule, the American Law Institute statutorily repudiated the equitable conversion doctrine in the Uniform Vendor and
Purchaser Risk Act. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE FORTY-FIFTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE, 138-39
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contract as the purchaser's sole remedy when the property has
been materially or totally destroyed, e7 a number of lower courts
have indicated that the purchaser's remedies should include specific performance with an abatement of the purchase price. 8 Recently, in Lucenti v. Cayuga Apartments, Inc.,e9 the Court of Appeals gave its imprimatur to this view, holding that a purchaser of
real property has a statutory right to specific performance with an
abatement in cases of material destruction of the purchased
property. 70
In Lucenti, the plaintiff contracted to buy improved real estate from the defendant.7 1 The contract was silent as to risk of
loss. 7 2 Before closing, one of the two buildings on the property was
"substantially destroyed" by fire.7 8 Subsequently, the purchaser
(1935). In 1936, New York became the first of ten jurisdictions to adopt some form of the
Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act. See UNIFORM VENDOR AND PURCHASER RISK Acr,
table at 553 (master ed. 1980). Notably, however, the New York statute differs from the
Uniform Act in that it explicitly provides for rescission in cases of material destruction and
for specific performance with an abatement where there has been an immaterial destruction.
Compare GOL § 5-1311(1)(a) (1978) with UNIFORM VENDOR AND PURCHASER RISK Acr § 1(a).
The Uniform Act, on the other hand, applies only to cases involving material or total destruction, and with respect to such cases merely denies the vendor his common-law right to
specific performance. UNIFORM VENDOR AND PURCHASER RISK ACT § 1.

" GOL § 5-1311(1)(a)(1) (1978). No criteria are provided in the statute to aid in determining what constitutes a "material" destruction of the property. Rather, the Law Revision
Commission asserted that the terms "material" and "immaterial" in the statute should be
construed according to their "recognized meaning in the law." 1936 Study, supra note 66, at
761. Predictably, the inquiry is sui generis. Compare National Factors, Inc. v. Winslow, 52
Misc. 2d 194, 196, 274 N.Y.S.2d 400, 401-02 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966) ($10,000 loss on
$180,000 contract is immaterial as a matter of law) with Rifkin v. Ed Zit Holding Corp., 254
N.Y. 352, 354, 173 N.E. 219, 219-20 (1930) (per curiam) (materiality of destruction caused
by condemnation of five of seventy-five lots is a question of fact).
61 See, e.g., Rizzo v. Landmark Realty Corp., 277 App. Div. 1094, 1095, 101 N.Y.S.2d
151, 152 (4th Dep't 1950); World Exhibit Corp. v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 186 Misc.
420, 422, 59 N.Y.S.2d 648, 651 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1945) (dictum), af'd, 270 App. Div.
654, 61 N.Y.S.2d 889 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 296 N.Y. 586, 68 N.E.2d 876 (1946); note 82
infra.
G 48 N.Y.2d 530, 399 N.E.2d 918, 423 N.Y.S.2d 886 (1979), aft'g, 59 App. Div. 2d 438,
400 N.Y.S.2d 194 (3d Dep't), rev'g, 90 Misc. 2d 154, 393 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Sup. Ct. Tompkins
County 1977).
70 48 N.Y.2d at 534, 399 N.E.2d at 919, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88.
71 90 Misc. 2d at 155, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
72 Id. at 156, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
73 Id. at 155, 156, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 228, 229. The monetary damage sustained was estimated by the purchaser to be $154,720 in replacement costs and $34,200 in "cost to cure."
In contrast, the defendant claimed that the damage sustained was only $8,750 in reduction
of fair market value of the property and that cost to cure was $6,507. 66 App. Div. 2d 928,
928, 410 N.Y.S.2d 928, 930 (3d Dep't 1978).
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sued for specific performance with an abatement.7 4 The Supreme
Court, Tompkins County, declined to order performance, interpreting the explicit grant of rescission in General Obligations Law
section 5-1311 as evincing the legislative intent to preclude alternate remedies.7 5 The Appellate Division, Third Department, unanimously reversed,78 holding that despite legislative history to the
contrary, the weight of judicial authority had interpreted the statute to allow specific performance with an abatement. 7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
appellate division.78 Judge Meyer, writing for a unanimous Court,
noted that the purpose of the statute was to reallocate risk, not to
delineate remedies.79 Therefore, the Court stated that the remedy
of specific performance with an abatement may be afforded the
90 Misc. 2d at 154, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
Id. at 156-59, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 229-31. The supreme court's decision to preclude the
remedy of specific performance with an abatement was largely predicated on the language in
the 1936 Study promulgated by the statute's draftsmen, the Law Revision Commission. See
id. The draftsmen indicated that the result obtained under the statute would be contrary to
the result in Polisiuk v. Mayers, 205 App. Div. 573, 200 N.Y.S. 97 (2d Dep't 1923), wherein
the court permitted the remedy of specific performance with an abatement in the event of
material destruction of the property. See 1936 Study, supra note 1, at 778; note 89 infra.
Special term in Lucenti agreed with the Law Revision Commission's assessment that rescission is "in accord with the actual, although unexpressed intention of the parties," 1936
Study, supra note 66, at 778-79, in the case of material destruction of the property. 90 Misc.
2d at 158, 393 N.Y.S.2d at 231.
76 59 App. Div. 2d at 443, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 196.
- Id. at 441, 400 N.Y.S.2d at 195. The Appellate Division, Third Department, remanded the case for a determination of the amount to be applied in abatement. The unreported decision of the Supreme Court of Tompkins County of March 30, 1978 on remand
was appealed by the defendant to the Appellate Division, Third Department, whereupon
the court determined the appropriate abatement to be $20,000 in lost property value and
$7,500 in cost to cure. 66 App. Div. 2d 928, 929, 410 N.Y.S.2d 928, 930 (3d Dep't 1978).
Generally, in determining the amount of compensation to be given in abatement,
neither the market value of the property, see McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y.
176, 181, 159 N.E. 902, 904 (1928), nor the insurance proceeds received for the loss, see
National Factors, Inc. v. Winslow, 52 Misc. 2d 194, 197, 274 N.Y.S.2d 400, 403 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1966), is the sole criterion. Rather, the abatement award appears to be determined by an amalgam of factors "'tending to throw light upon the subject'. . . as well as
the equities between the parties," Burack v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 9 App. Div. 2d 914,
194 N.Y.S.2d 987 (2d Dep't 1959) (quoting McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins., 247 N.Y. at 184,
159 N.E.2d at 905), afl'd sub nom. Burack v. Tollig, 10 N.Y.2d 879, 179 N.E.2d 509, 223
N.Y.S.2d 505 (1961).
78 48 N.Y.2d at 542, 399 N.E.2d at 924, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 893.
7' Id. at 534, 399 N.E.2d at 919, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88. The Court relied on its observation in Hecht v. Meller, 23 N.Y.2d 301, 304, 244 N.E.2d 77, 78, 296 N.Y.S.2d 561, 562
(1968), that the purpose of the enactment of the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act
by the New York Legislature was "simply [to bestow] a privilege on vendee to rescind the
contract." Id.
71
75
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purchaser without contravening the statute's legislative intent.8 0

The Lucenti Court went on to reject the Law Revision Commission's conclusion that rescission of the contract is the remedy most
likely intended by the parties when the property has been materially destroyed. 8 Rather, the Court noted, the actual although unexpressed intention of the parties is more accurately reflected in
the stance uniformly adopted by the lower courts which have accorded the purchaser the right to enforce the contract with an
abatement in the purchase price.8 2 Moreover, Judge Meyer concluded, in consolidating the risk of loss statute, formerly found in
the Real Property Law, into the General Obligations Law, the legislature had presumptive knowledge of this judicial interpretation
of the statute's remedies.8 3 Thus, he reasoned, the legislature had
impliedly incorporated the right of specific performance with an
abatement into the statute by failing to expressly preclude it."
Notwithstanding that the result reached in Lucenti equitably
effectuates the apparent intention of the contracting parties, it appears that the Court misconstrued the effect of the recodification
of the statute and gave undue weight to prior decisions. In holding
that the legislature acquiesced in, and hence impliedly sanctioned,
the previous common-law construction of the statute, the Court
apparently failed to consider that "no change in existing law" was
85
intended by the draftsmen of the General Obligations Law.
8' 48 N.Y.2d at 538-39, 399 N.E.2d at 921-22, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91.
Id. at 538-39, 399 N.E.2d at 922, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 890-91.
82

Id. at 539-41, 399 N.E.2d at 922-23, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 891-92 (citing County of West-

chester v. P. & M. Materials Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 431, 433-34, 248 N.Y.S.2d 539, 542 (2d
Dep't 1964) (per curiam); Rizzo v. Landmark Realty Corp., 277 App. Div. 1094, 1095, 101

N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (4th Dep't 1950); Heerdt v. Brand, 272 App. Div. 143, 144, 70 N.Y.S.2d 1,
2 (4th Dep't 1947) (per curiam); Burack v. Tollig, 6 Misc. 2d 450, 451, 160 N.Y.S.2d 1008,
1009 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1957), modified sub nom. Burack v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 9 App. Div. 2d 914, 194 N.Y.S.2d 987 (2d Dep't 1959), aff'd sub nom. Burack v.
Tollig, 10 N.Y.2d 879, 179 N.E.2d 509, 223 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1961); World Exhibit Corp. v. City
Bank Farmers Trust Co., 186 Misc. 420, 422, 59 N.Y.S.2d 648, 651 (Sup. Ct. Kings County
1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 654, 61 N.Y.S.2d 889 (2d Dep't), af'd, 296 N.Y. 586, 68 N.E.2d
876 (1946)).

03 48 N.Y.2d at 541-42, 399 N.E.2d at 923, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 892-93.
84

Id.

The Court relied, inter alia, on N.Y.

STATUTES

§ 75 (McKinney 1971), which

provides in pertinent part:
In the case of a revision or consolidation of statutes, if there is no change in the

phraseology of the statute, its former judicial construction becomes a part of the
subsequent statute.

Id.
85 See Act and Recommendation Relating to the Reconsolidation in a "General Obligations Law" of Statutes Governing the Creation, Definition, Enforcement, Transfer, Modifi-
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Rather than supporting the inference that a substantive reexamination of the statute was undertaken, the Law Revision Commisson Study clearly indicates that the consolidation of the Uniform
Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act into its present repository was intended by the legislature to be merely clerical in nature." Nor does
an examination of the prior cases cited by the majority compel the
conclusion that a cognizant legislature would have been convinced
that the statute had been dispositively interpreted to allow a purchaser the remedy of specific performance with an abatement.
Generally the cases relied upon by the Lucenti Court as providing
the legislature with that knowledge either indicated the availability
of such remedy in dicta, or allowed the relief in response to a concession of the parties.87 In addition, none of the precedent cited by
the Court squarely addressed the Law Revision Commission's
statement in its study accompanying the Uniform Vendor and
cation, Discharge and Revival of Various Civil Obligations, [1963] N.Y. LAW REv. COMM'N
REP. 201, 272.
Although it may be argued that the legislature approved the judicial interpretation of
the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act when it indicated that no change in the law
was intended by the General Obligations Law's formation, the context of the Law Revision
Commission's Study strongly suggests that the legislature undertook no substantive evaluations of the statutes consolidated into the General Obligations Law. See id. at 271-72. In
creating the General Obligations Law, the legislative intent was simply "to make it easier to
find the statutes," and "to provide a logical and coherent organization of existing statutes
[dealing with 'civil' obligations]." Id. at 272; cf. 1A J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.14 (4th ed. 1972) (unless statutory language is changed, codification is mere reiteration of previously existing law with no altering effects). Viewed in this context, it appears
that the Law Revision Commission's Study serves to rebut the presumption that the legislature both knew of and accepted the previous judicial interpretation of the reconsolidated
statutes.
87 See County of Westchester v. P. & M. Materials Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 431, 248
N.Y.S.2d 539 (2d Dep't 1964) (per curiam) (dictum); Heerdt v. Brand, 272 App. Div. 143, 70
N.Y.S.2d 1 (4th Dep't 1947) (per curiam) (court does not clearly indicate whether the damage is deemed immaterial or substantial); Burack v. Tollig, 6 Misc. 2d 450, 160 N.Y.S.2d
1008 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1957), modified sub nom. Burack v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 9 App. Div. 2d 914, 194 N.Y.S.2d 987 (2d Dep't 1959), afrd sub nom. Burack v.
Tollig, 10 N.Y.2d 879, 179 N.E.2d 509, 223 N.Y.S.2d 505 (1961) (parties conceded that
abatement should be granted); World Exhibit Corp. v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 186
Misc. 420, 59 N.Y.S.2d 648 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1945) (dictum), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 654,
61 N.Y.S.2d 889 (2d Dep't), af'd, 296 N.Y. 586, 68 N.E.2d 876 (1946). But see Rizzo v.
Landmark Realty Corp., 277 App. Div. 1094, 101 N.Y.S.2d 151 (4th Dep't 1950). See also
Property, Roberts, 1977 Survey of New York Law, 29 SYncusE L. REv. 421, 422-23 & n.14
(1978). Since only one of the five cases relied upon by the Lucenti Court-an appellate
division decision-actually held that a purchaser possesses the remedy of specific performance with an abatement, the suggestion that the legislature had acquiesced in such construction by inaction appears questionable at best.
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Purchaser Risk Act 8 s which indicated that the import of the act
would be to change the result in a prior case 9 granting specific
performance with an abatement where the subject property had

been materially destroyed. This statement of the Commission is
weighty evidence that the legislature intended to preclude the rem-

edy sanctioned in Lucenti. Thus, even assuming that prior case law
did alter the result dictated by a literal reading of the statute, it
does not appear that this interpretaton was incorporated into the

General Obligations Law by legislative inaction.
Despite the questionable interpretation of legislative intent

upon which it is founded, it appears that application of the
Lucenti holding will bring about equitable results in most situations. Nevertheless, in instances in which the purchaser intends to
demolish and remove existing structures on the property, applica-

tion of the Lucenti rule may create an injustice to the vendor and
a windfall for the purchaser. In this situation, if the existing struc-

ture is razed prior to closing, Lucenti would allow the purchaser to
command an abatement in the purchase price even though he may
have been relieved of a large portion of his cost of demolition.9

Given this potential, it is submitted that cautious sellers' attorneys
88 Reference to the 1936 Study is made in only two of the opinions relied upon by the
Lucenti Court. See County of Westchester v. P. & M. Materials Corp., 20 App. Div. 2d 431,
248 N.Y.S.2d 539 (2d Dep't 1964) (per curiam); Heerdt v. Brand, 272 App. Div. 143, 70
N.Y.S. 1 (4th Dep't 1947) (per curiam). Neither Westchester nor Heerdt, however, are illuminating as to the rationale applied in concluding that the common-law interpretation statute superceded its legislative history.
89 Polisiuk v. Mayers, 205 App. Div. 573, 200 N.Y.S. 97 (2d Dep't 1923). In Polisiuk,
wherein the seller had contractually assumed the risk of loss by fire, id. at 574, 200 N.Y.S. at
98, the appellate division determined that it was within the realm of the court's equity
powers to accord the remedy of specific performance with an abatement to the purchaser.
Id. at 579, 200 N.Y.S. at 102. The Law Revision Commission subsequently rejected the
Polisiuk result while discussing section 1(a) of the Uniform Vendor and Purchaser Risk Act,
see note 1 supra. See 1936 Study, supra note 66, at 778. The Lucenti Court, however, believed that section 1(a) of the act concerned shifting the risk of loss and not the allocation of
remedy. See 48 N.Y.2d at 534, 399 N.E.2d at 919, 423 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88 (citing Hecht v.
Meller, 23 N.Y.2d 301, 304, 244 N.E.2d 77, 78, 296 N.Y.S.2d 561, 562 (1968)).
980Another inequitable situation may arise in a condemnation setting. Under the
Lucenti holding, a purchaser may elect specific performance with an abatement for property
that had been taken to facilitate the building of a major highway. This abatement may
constitute a windfall, however, since the purchaser may not actually sustain damage if the
roadway will substantially increase the value of the remaining land. It is certainly arguable
that if the vendor had contemplated such occurrence at the time of contracting, he would
neither have intended nor expected that the contract be enforceable. Hence, by attributing
to the vendor the intent to perform the contract notwithstanding a material change in circumstances, the Lucenti Court's holding in some cases may actually frustrate the expectations of one or both parties.
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would do well to provide explicitly for the risk of loss in sales contracts so as to avoid gratuitously allowing the purchaser the nowbroadened range of statutory remedies.9 1
Jeffrey S. Lichtman

DEVELOPMENTS IN NEW YORK LAW

Cohabitation without marriage does not give rise to recovery in
implied-in-law contract for personal services rendered
Actions between unmarried cohabiting individuals to recover
compensation for personal services rendered pursuant to an express contract generally have been allowed provided that illicit relations do not form any part of the consideration.9 2 New York
courts, however, consistently have refused to recognize implied
contracts for personal services within such a relationship.9 3 This
position has come under attack in other jurisdictions," most nota91 Notably, the New York Court of Appeals has held that a contractual clause reiterating the effect of GOL § 5-1311-that the risk of loss by fire is on the seller-serves to take
the contract outside the statutory purview and within common-law rules, at least to the
extent of the risks for which express provision was made. See World Exhibit Corp. v. City
Bank Farmers Trust Co., 270 App. Div. 654, 657-58, 61 N.Y.S.2d 889, 892 (2d Dep't), affld,
296 N.Y. 586, 68 N.E.2d 876 (1946); Approved Properties, Inc. v. City of New York, 52 Misc.
2d 956, 958, 277 N.Y.S.2d 236, 238 (Sup. Ct. Richmond County 1966). A contract provision
requiring the purchaser to accept the property "as is," however, will not shift the risk of loss
to the purchaser since such provision only refers to a risk of natural deterioration and wear
and tear, and does not apply to "intervening acts of destruction." Id. at 957-58, 277
N.Y.S.2d at 237-38.
"See In re Gorden, 8 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 168 N.E.2d 239, 240, 202 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1960);
McCall v. Frampton, 99 Misc. 2d 159, 415 N.Y.S.2d 752 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1979); Rhodes v. Stone, 63 Hun 624, 624, 17 N.Y.S. 561, 562 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 5th Dep't
1892). The courts' recognition of the validity of express contracts for personal services between cohabiting parties differs sharply from the rule governing married persons. Such contracts between married persons are clearly unenforceable. In re Callister, 153 N.Y. 294, 301,
47 N.E. 268, 270 (1897); In re Paine, 12 N.Y.S.2d 201, 203 (Sur. Ct. Queens County 1939).
"3 See In re Gordon, 8 N.Y.2d 71, 75, 168 N.E.2d 239, 240, 202 N.Y.S.2d 1, 3 (1960);
Vincent v. Morarity, 31 App. Div. 484, 492, 52 N.Y.S. 519, 525 (2d Dep't 1898); Rhodes v.
Stone, 63 Hun 624, 624, 17 N.Y.S. 561, 562 (Sup. Ct. Gen. T. 5th Dep't 1892). The rationale
behind refusing to recognize an action in implied contract between a cohabiting couple for
personal services is that cohabitation belies an intention that such services are being performed for compensation. See Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892 (1888). Not all
courts, however, subscribe to this reasoning. See note 96 infra.
"See, e.g., Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1980); Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d
249 (Minn. 1977).

